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ABSTRACT—The Northwestern University Law Review’s 2017 Symposium 
asked whether McCleskey v. Kemp closed the door on social science’s ability 
to meaningfully contribute to equal protection deliberations. This inquiry is 
understandable; McCleskey is widely understood to have rendered statistical 
racial disparities doctrinally irrelevant in the equal protection context. We 
suggest, however, that this account overstates McCleskey and its doctrinal 
impact. Roughly fifteen years after McCleskey, Chief Justice Rehnquist—
himself part of the McCleskey majority—invoked admissions data to support 
his conclusion that the University of Michigan Law School 
unconstitutionally discriminated against White applicants. 
Chief Justice Rehnquist’s disparate treatment of statistical evidence in 
McCleskey and Grutter v. Bollinger reveals the doctrine’s under-
determinacy and invites a corresponding inquiry: why do Justices rely on 
social science in some cases, yet reject it in others? We propose that one 
answer lies at the intersections of Critical Race Theory and empirical 
scholarship on motivated social cognition. This “eCRT” lens illuminates 
how ostensibly neutral biases and heuristics, when informed by socially 
salient racial stereotypes, will predictably and systematically lead judges to 
over-value “evidence” that rationalizes existing racial disparities and, as a 
result, author legal opinions that re-instantiate and legitimize the status quo. 
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The Northwestern University Law Review’s 2017 Symposium: A Fear 
of Too Much Justice? asked whether McCleskey v. Kemp1 “closed the door 
on the ability of the social sciences to meaningfully contribute to Equal 
Protection deliberations.”2 One straightforward response is yes: McCleskey 
rendered statistical evidence of racial disparities doctrinally irrelevant in the 
Equal Protection context.3 Although understandable, this account overstates 
the degree to which McCleskey has constrained the Supreme Court’s 
engagement with social science and, more specifically, its treatment of 
statistical evidence of racial disparities. 
Roughly fifteen years after McCleskey, in Grutter v. Bollinger, Chief 
Justice Rehnquist—himself part of the McCleskey majority—proffered 
statistical evidence as dispositive proof that the University of Michigan Law 
School had unconstitutionally discriminated against White applicants.4 Chief 
Justice Rehnquist’s dissent in Grutter offers one notable example, but it 
 
 1 McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 291–92 (1987) (rejecting an equal protection claim that was 
based on statistical racial disparities). 
 2 The Northwestern University Law Review 2017 Symposium: “A Fear of Too Much Justice”?, NW. 
U. L. REV., http://www.northwesternlawreview.org/symposium [https://perma.cc/J9BM-2V32]. 
 3 See, e.g., David C. Baldus et al., Reflections on the “Inevitability” of Racial Discrimination in 
Capital Sentencing and the “Impossibility” of Its Prevention, Detection, and Correction, 51 WASH. & 
LEE L. REV. 359, 374 (1994) (“The decision has eliminated the federal courts as a forum for the 
consideration of statistically based claims of racial discrimination in capital sentencing.”). Statistical 
evidence of systemic disparate treatment remains probative of unlawful conduct under statutory regimes 
such as Title VII. See, e.g., Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385, 387 (1986) (per curiam) (reversing lower 
court’s holding that regression analyses “were unacceptable as evidence of discrimination”); see Noah D. 
Zatz, Disparate Impact and the Unity of Equality Law, 97 B.U. L. REV. 1357, 1387–92 (2017) (describing 
Title VII systemic disparate treatment claims). 
 4 See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 378–87 (2003) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (“Petitioner 
may use these statistics to expose this sham, which is the basis for the Law School’s admission of less 
qualified underrepresented minorities in preference to her. Surely strict scrutiny cannot permit these sorts 
of disparities without at least some explanation.”). 
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reflects a broader practice, post-McCleskey, of Justices mobilizing “social 
science”5 to support or contest claims of unconstitutional discrimination.6 
The Court’s continued interest in social science invites the following 
reframing of the Symposium’s driving inquiry: Why does a judge mobilize 
social science in one instance, yet denounce it in another?7 To interrogate 
this question, and in the spirit of “eCRT,”8 we propose an approach that weds 
social science and Critical Race Theory (“CRT”). After first anchoring to 
core CRT insights, we add analytical texture by drawing on well-established 
scholarship from the field of motivated social cognition, which has 
illuminated the subjective yet subconscious ways in which humans adopt and 
maintain personal beliefs to satisfy psychological needs or goals.9 This 
interdisciplinary approach situates the analysis at the intersections of 
complex societal structures and forces (e.g., legal doctrine, media 
representations, and existing racial disparities) and individual 
decisionmaking (e.g., judicial engagement with social science). 
 
 5 In this Essay, we use “social science” to broadly encompass all empirical research methods, whether 
quantitative or qualitative. 
 6 See, e.g., Fisher v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2212 (2016) (citing quantitative and qualitative evidence 
that racial diversity has pedagogical benefits); Fisher v. Texas, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2431 (2013) (Thomas, J., 
concurring) (invoking research to suggest that affirmative action harms its beneficiaries who become 
“mis-match[ed]” at elite institutions); Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330 (invoking amici briefs describing research 
on the pedagogical benefits of racial diversity); see also Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 & n.11 
(1954) (citing psychology studies to support the contention that segregated schooling harmed African-
American children). Social science has figured beyond the equal protection context.  This includes, for 
instance, the Supreme Court’s adjudication of Eighth Amendment claims brought on behalf of juveniles 
sentenced to life without parole. See, e.g., Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 471–72 (2012) (noting that 
the Court’s prior decisions relied on social science). Early twentieth-century citizenship cases reveal how 
the Court has selectively utilized social science to police the boundaries of Whiteness. See, e.g., United 
States v. Thind, 261 U.S. 204, 208–09 (1923); Ozawa v. United States, 260 U.S. 178, 197 (1922). See 
generally Michael Heise, The Past, Present, and Future of Empirical Legal Scholarship: Judicial 
Decision Making and the New Empiricism, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 819 (2002) (analyzing trends in the way 
courts have used empirical research over time). 
 7 By engaging this particular question, we are not suggesting that McCleskey is doctrinally or 
practically irrelevant vis-à-vis the role of social science in the equal protection context. McCleskey has 
and will continue to matter—for instance, by preventing capital defendants from contesting their 
sentences with inferential statistics revealing systemic racially disparate treatment. Nor should we forget 
that the state of Georgia executed Warren McCleskey on September 25, 1991. See Peter Applebome, 
Georgia Inmate Is Executed After ‘Chaotic’ Legal Move, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 26, 1991), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1991/09/26/us/georgia-inmate-is-executed-after-chaotic-legal-move.html 
[https://perma.cc/8ZLE-FBAX].  
 8 “eCRT” refers to a theoretical approach that intentionally engages and interrogates the intersections 
of Critical Race Theory and the social sciences. See generally Devon W. Carbado & Daria Roithmayr, 
Critical Race Theory Meets Social Science, 10 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 149 (2014) (exploring the 
prospects of a collaboration between Critical Race Theory and social science). 
 9 E.g., John T. Jost et al., Political Conservatism as Motivated Social Cognition, 129 PSYCHOL. 
BULL. 339 (2003) (meta-analysis identifying psychological variables that predict political conservatism). 
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From this point of departure, we narrow our analysis by introducing a 
model that outlines how socially salient stereotypes that privilege and center 
Whiteness and ostensibly neutral biases and heuristics intersect to rationalize 
the underrepresentation of African American students in colleges and 
universities. If left unchecked, these intersecting forces will predictably and 
systematically lead judges to show greater deference to statistical evidence 
that aligns with, and perpetuates, prevailing lay theories that explain racial 
disparities not as a product of discrimination, but rather as a consequence of 
neutral and natural market forces. 
I. DOCTRINE’S UNDER-DETERMINACY: MCCLESKEY V. GRUTTER 
A. Rejecting Statistical Disparities (in McCleskey) 
In 1987, the Supreme Court rejected Warren McCleskey’s claim that 
systemic racial discrimination in Georgia’s capital punishment regime 
rendered his death sentence unconstitutional.10 To advance his claim, 
McCleskey relied principally on the “Baldus Study,” which “purport[ed] to 
show a disparity in the imposition of the death sentence in Georgia based on 
the race of the murder victim and, to a lesser extent, the race of the 
defendant.”11 The Baldus Study comprised “two sophisticated statistical 
studies” that analyzed over 2,000 Georgia murder cases from the 1970s.12 
These studies accounted for “230 variables that could have explained the 
disparities on nonracial grounds,” and suggested that the race of the 
defendant and the victim had a statistically significant impact on whether a 
defendant received a death sentence.13 
The Court determined that the Baldus Study was insufficient to support 
McCleskey’s constitutional claim.14 According to the Court,15 a defendant 
 
 10 McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 291–92 (1987). 
 11 Id. at 286. 
 12 Id. 
 13 Id. at 287. 
 14 Id. at 292–306 (rejecting the equal protection and Eighth Amendment claims). This outcome was 
not preordained by precedent, as existing case law had permitted statistical disparities to establish 
discriminatory intent. Id. at 293 (“The Court has accepted statistics as proof of intent to discriminate in 
certain limited contexts.”); see also Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 501 (1977) (Marshall, J., 
concurring) (“The statistical evidence, then, at the very least supports an inference that Mexican-
Americans were discriminated against in the choice of grand jurors.”). The Court, however, distinguished 
this precedent from the capital sentencing context. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 294–97. 
 15 The Court did not dispute that the Baldus Study supported an inference of systemic discrimination 
endemic to Georgia’s criminal justice system. To the contrary, Justice Scalia’s posthumously released 
conference memorandum revealed that he appreciated the prevalence of racial bias. See Memorandum to 
the Conference from Justice Antonin Scalia in No. 84-6811—McCleskey v. Kemp of Jan. 6, 1987, 
McCleskey v. Kemp File, THURGOOD MARSHALL PAPERS, The Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. 
(“Since it is my view that the unconscious operation of irrational sympathies and antipathies, including 
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asserting an equal protection violation must (a) establish the existence of 
“purposeful discrimination”16 and (b) causally link this “purposeful 
discrimination” to their individual case.17 The Baldus Study was insufficient 
because it “offer[ed] no evidence specific to [McCleskey’s] own case that 
would support an inference that racial considerations played a part in his 
sentence.”18 In effect, the Court rendered the study irrelevant because it did 
not directly link a prohibited mental state (“purposeful discrimination”) to 
the decisionmakers (a jury) who determined McCleskey’s sentence. 
The Court tethered this doctrinal argument to normative policy 
concerns.  For instance, the Court noted that were the Baldus Study sufficient 
to establish an equal protection violation, it would have rendered 
constitutionally suspect Georgia’s entire capital punishment regime.19 In 
other words, doctrinally legitimating the Baldus Study would have risked 
destabilizing fundamental sites of state power in Georgia and beyond.20 This 
anxiety was not foreign to the McCleskey majority; similar concerns had 
animated the Court’s rejection of disparate impact theory in the 
constitutional context only a decade earlier.21 
 
racial, upon jury decisions and (hence) prosecutorial decisions is real, acknowledged in the decisions of 
this court, and ineradicable, I cannot honestly say that all I need is more proof.”). 
 16 McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 292 (“Our analysis begins with the basic principle that a defendant who 
alleges an equal protection violation has the burden of proving ‘the existence of purposeful 
discrimination.’” (quoting Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545, 550 (1967))). For an extensive critique of 
the Court’s evolving use of “purposeful discrimination” in the equal protection context, see Ian Haney- 
López, Intentional Blindness, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1779 (2012). 
 17 McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 292 (“Thus, to prevail under the Equal Protection Clause, McCleskey must 
prove that the decisionmakers in his case acted with discriminatory purpose.”). 
 18 Id. at 292–93. 
 19 Id. (“In its broadest form, McCleskey’s claim of discrimination extends to every actor in the 
Georgia capital sentencing process, from the prosecutor who sought the death penalty and the jury that 
imposed the sentence, to the State itself that enacted the capital punishment statute and allows it to remain 
in effect despite its allegedly discriminatory application. . . . McCleskey’s claim that these statistics are 
sufficient proof of discrimination, without regard to the facts of a particular case, would extend to all 
capital cases in Georgia, at least where the victim was white and the defendant is black.”). This reasoning 
inspired Justice Brennan’s now-famous rhetorical response that the majority exhibited “a fear of too much 
justice.” Id. at 339 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“The Court next states that its unwillingness to regard 
petitioner’s evidence as sufficient is based in part on the fear that recognition of McCleskey’s claim would 
open the door to widespread challenges to all aspects of criminal sentencing. Taken on its face, such a 
statement seems to suggest a fear of too much justice.”) (emphasis added) (internal citation omitted). 
 20 This disruption likely would have extended beyond Georgia. See Rook v. Rice, 478 U.S. 1040, 
1040 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“[Petitioner] contends that newly available social science evidence 
demonstrates unconstitutional, system-wide racial disparities in North Carolina’s capital sentencing 
system. . . . Other petitioners have presented similar claims of system-wide racial disparities in capital 
sentencing and have requested stays of execution from this Court in light of our grants of certiorari in 
McCleskey and Hitchcock.”). 
 21 See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 248 (1976) (expressing concern that a disparate impact 
cause of action “would raise serious questions about, and perhaps invalidate, a whole range of tax, 
welfare, public service, regulatory, and licensing statutes that may be more burdensome to the poor and 
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B. Invoking Statistical Disparities (in Grutter) 
McCleskey reflects a Court hostile to claims of unconstitutional race 
discrimination predicated on statistical evidence of racial disparities. Yet 
roughly fifteen years later, Chief Justice Rehnquist—himself part of the 
McCleskey majority—employed evidence of racial disparities to support his 
conclusion that the University of Michigan Law School unconstitutionally 
discriminated against White applicants.22 
In 1997, Barbara Grutter sued the University of Michigan Law School 
(Law School) after it had rejected her application the previous year.23 The 
Law School utilized a “highly individualized, holistic review of each 
applicant’s file” that permitted the consideration of an applicant’s race.24 
Grutter argued that the policy unconstitutionally discriminated against her in 
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.25 The Court rejected her claim, 
concluding that the Law School’s policy was narrowly tailored to serve the 
compelling interest of student body diversity.26 
In dissent, Chief Justice Rehnquist focused much of his opinion on six 
years of the Law School’s admissions data spanning from 1995 through 
2000.27 After first comparing the percentages of applicants and admittees by 
race,28 Chief Justice Rehnquist highlighted that in the 2000 admissions cycle, 
the Law School admitted a higher percentage of African Americans who fell 
within certain LSAT and GPA ranges than Hispanics who fell into those 
same ranges.29 
According to the Chief Justice, these statistics “ha[d] a significant 
bearing on petitioner’s case” by “expos[ing]” that the Law School 
 
to the average black than to the more affluent white”). See also Mario L. Barnes & Erwin Chemerinsky, 
The Once and Future Equal Protection Doctrine?, 43 CONN. L. REV. 1059, 1082 (2011); Elise C. Boddie, 
Adaptive Discrimination, 94 N.C. L. REV. 1235, 1275 (2016). 
 22 See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 381–87 (Rehnquist, C.J, dissenting). Justice Scalia, who 
joined Chief Justice Rehnquist’s Grutter dissent, was also a member of the McCleskey majority. 
 23 Id. at 316. 
 24 Id. at 337. 
 25 Id. at 317 (Grutter also alleged that the Law School violated Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964 and 42 U.S.C. § 1981). 
 26 Id. at 334–35. 
 27 Id. at 381–86 & tbls. 1, 2 & 3 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Chief Justice Rehnquist did not discuss 
data regarding White and Asian applicants and admittees. Id. 
 28 Id. 
 29 Id. at 382 (“[I]n 2000, 12 Hispanics who scored between a 159–160 on the LSAT and earned a 
GPA of 3.00 or higher applied for admission and only 2 were admitted. Meanwhile, 12 African-
Americans in the same range of qualifications applied for admission and all 12 were admitted. Likewise, 
that same year, 16 Hispanics who scored between a 151–153 on the LSAT and earned a 3.00 or higher 
applied for admission and only 1 of those applicants was admitted. Twenty-three similarly qualified 
African-Americans applied for admission and 14 were admitted.”) (internal citations omitted). 
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impermissibly considered race during its admissions process.30 The 
correlation between the percentages of African American, Hispanic, and 
Native American applicants and admittees was, in the Chief Justice’s view, 
“far too precise to be dismissed as merely the result of” constitutionally 
permissible behavior.31 To the contrary, he concluded, the “tight correlation 
between the percentage of applicants and admittees of a given race . . . must 
result from careful race based planning by the Law School.”32 
C. Identifying Inconsistencies 
We highlight Chief Justice Rehnquist’s Grutter dissent not to debate, 
on the merits, his reliance on admissions data. Nor do we mean to suggest 
that Grutter and McCleskey present factual analogues. Nonetheless, we 
highlight the Chief Justice’s dissent because his treatment of data in Grutter 
appears facially irreconcilable with the majority’s denouncement of the 
Baldus Study in McCleskey. Multiple distinctions across these two opinions 
deserve mention. 
First, the data. The admissions statistics in Grutter constituted 
“descriptive statistics”33—that is, raw numbers, averages, and percentages 
that describe a population (here, Law School applicants and admittees). 
Importantly, descriptive statistics do not permit conclusions beyond the 
statistics themselves.34 The admissions data—although in certain ways 
revealing35—were therefore of limited use to answer, for instance, whether 
and to what extent race was a causal factor in the Law School’s admissions 
process generally, and whether race could be causally linked to Barbara 
Grutter’s personal rejection.36 Additional statistical analyses would have 
been required to answer such questions. 
 
 30 Id. at 382–83. 
 31 Id. at 383. 
 32 Id. at 385. 
 33 Descriptive statistics report and describe quantitative information. See Jerrold H. Zar, 
BIOSTATISTICAL ANALYSIS 22–35 (5th ed. 2009). 
 34 See John H. Matheson, Why Courts Pierce: An Empirical Study of Piercing the Corporate Veil, 
7 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 1, 13 n.38 (2010) (“Perceived differences based on percentages are misleading. 
What may seem different at first glance may actually have a high amount of variability within and among 
the data. Therefore, a difference seen between two different factors may not actually be a real statistical 
difference. This is the main difference between descriptive statistics and inferential or inductive statistics. 
Descriptive statistics allow for an overall quantitative picture of the data. Inferential statistics allow testing 
of inferential relationships among data.”) (citing Jerrold H. Zar, BIOSTATISTICAL ANALYSIS 22–35 (5th 
ed. 2009). 
 35 We are not suggesting that descriptive statistics are never probative of unconstitutional 
discrimination. Nonetheless, judges should take care not to overread into, or draw unwarranted empirical 
conclusions from, descriptive statistics. 
 36 There is no indication that the admissions data were subjected to any statistical analyses that, like 
the Baldus Study, controlled for nonracial factors relevant to the admissions process. 
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In McCleskey, by contrast, the Baldus Study consisted of “inferential 
statistics,” which use samples of data to draw broader inferences about a 
population.37 Thus, the Baldus Study was competent to make a supportable 
claim, in ways that the descriptive statistics in Grutter could not, that 
systemic racially disparate treatment pervaded Georgia’s capital punishment 
regime.38   
Second, the doctrine. In McCleskey, the Court required evidence that 
causally linked a particular mental state (purposeful discrimination) to the 
alleged harm (McCleskey’s sentence). The Baldus Study, which could not 
causally establish that McCleskey’s sentence was the product of purposeful 
discrimination, was rendered doctrinally irrelevant.39 
In contrast, Chief Justice Rehnquist never suggested that Grutter’s 
discrimination claim required causal proof that the Law School rejected 
her—consciously or otherwise—because she was White.40 Even if such 
causal evidence had been required, the descriptive statistics likely would 
have satisfied the Chief Justice, who appeared to conclude that the 
admissions data proved causation and unconstitutional discrimination in 
Grutter’s individual case: “[Grutter] may use these statistics to expose this 
sham, which is the basis for the Law School’s admission of less qualified 
underrepresented minorities in preference to her.”41 
Third, the presumptions. The McCleskey majority muted the Baldus 
Study’s probative value, in part, by noting that a nonracial reason explained 
McCleskey’s sentence: McCleskey had committed a crime that was 
 
 37 See generally A.F. HAYES, INTRODUCTION TO MEDIATION, MODERATION, AND CONDITIONAL 
PROCESS ANALYSIS: A REGRESSION-BASED APPROACH (2013) (explaining the concept whereby studies 
of a small group are used to infer conclusions about larger populations); see also McCleskey v. Kemp, 
481 U.S. 279, 287–92, 287 n.5, 288 n.6, 291 n.7 (1987). 
 38 See McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 287–92, 287 n.5, 288 n.6, 291 n.7.  
 39 Id. at 297 (“Accordingly, we hold that the Baldus study is clearly insufficient to support an 
inference that any of the decisionmakers in McCleskey’s case acted with discriminatory purpose.”). 
 40 Nor did the majority. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 327–44 (2003) (no discussion of 
causation requirements). The fact that a university permits the consideration of race in its admissions 
process does not establish that the institution took a particular applicant’s race into account, or whether—
even if it had—the applicant would have been admitted but for her or his race. The Court’s treatment of 
causation in Grutter avoids this reality by drawing on precedent that links constitutional standing and 
causation to the plaintiff’s right to compete, not the denial of admission (which the plaintiff may not have 
obtained even under a formally colorblind regime). See id. at 317 (citing Ne. Fla. Chapter of Associated 
Gen. Contractors of Am. v. City of Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 656, 666 (1993) (“The ‘injury in fact’ in an 
equal protection case of this variety is the denial of equal treatment resulting from the imposition of the 
barrier, not the ultimate inability to obtain the benefit.”)). 
 41 Id. at 382–83 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (proclaiming that the admissions data “reflect[] a 
consistent practice” that had a “significant bearing on petitioner’s case” and that “[t]hese different 
numbers, moreover, come only as a result of substantially different treatment among the three 
underrepresented minority groups . . . .”).   
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punishable by death.42 In so stating, the Court subordinated McCleskey’s 
discrimination theory to other, more “plausible” explanations. The reverse 
occurred in Grutter, where Chief Justice Rehnquist appeared to presume 
racial discrimination and subordinate alternative explanations. He never, for 
instance, questioned whether something other than race caused Grutter’s 
rejection (for instance, that the Law School had rejected Grutter because she 
was less qualified than other applicants).43 
McCleskey and Grutter involved different factual circumstances and 
distinct types of statistical evidence of discrimination.44 These distinctions 
do not, however, support the disparate ways in which Chief Justice 
Rehnquist (and Justice Scalia) engaged data across the two cases. Given this 
disparate treatment of data, these two opinions appear inconsistent.  We 
would argue, however, that when viewed within the context of salient lay 
theories about discrimination and racial disparities in American society, the 
facially disparate treatment of data in McCleskey and Grutter reappear more 
harmonious than divergent.45 To unpack this harmony, we now turn to 
Critical Race Theory and complementary social science to explore why 
judges leverage statistical evidence of discrimination in some cases, yet 
reject it in others. 
II. BLIND MOTIVATION 
So what explains why judges accept social science data in some 
instances and reject it in others? A “legal realist”46 might posit that Justices 
 
 42 See McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 296–97 (“Moreover, absent far stronger proof, it is unnecessary to 
seek such a rebuttal, because a legitimate and unchallenged explanation for the decision is apparent from 
the record: McCleskey committed an act for which the United States Constitution and Georgia laws 
permit imposition of the death penalty.”). 
 43 To presume that Grutter was undeservedly rejected because of race requires the corresponding 
assumption that the Law School admitted undeserving students of color. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 385 
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (“It suggests a formula for admission based on the aspirational assumption 
that all applicants are equally qualified academically, and therefore that the proportion of each group 
admitted should be the same as the proportion of that group in the applicant pool.”). In a sense, Chief 
Justice Rehnquist seems to suggest that were admissions markets functioning without racial 
discrimination, students of color would be appropriately underrepresented. 
 44 One final inconsistency deserves mention: the stakes. Grutter involved admission to the University 
of Michigan Law School. Without doubt, entry into a competitive and elite institution of higher education 
is a coveted prize. But in McCleskey, life literally was on the line (and subsequently taken by the State). 
 45 One could argue that Chief Justice Rehnquist’s disparate treatment of the data is an appropriate 
and principled application of prevailing equal protection doctrine. Even to the extent this is accurate, 
which we would contest, equal protection doctrine is not a natural and fixed phenomenon exogenous from 
the Justices who inhabit the Court. See Haney-López, supra note 16 (describing the Supreme Court’s 
evolving equal protection jurisprudence). 
 46 See generally Karl N. Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism—Responding to Dean Pound, 
44 HARV. L. REV. 1222, 1223 (1931) (“They view rules, they view law, as means to ends; as only means 
to ends; as having meaning only insofar as they are means to ends.”). 
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are simply ends-oriented. Doctrine cabins discretion, but Justices remain 
rational actors who consciously and selectively cite evidence to reach a 
desired and pre-determined outcome.47 The legal realist narrative is 
attractive; it disrupts deterministic accounts of the law and legal reasoning 
that fetishize doctrine as stable, inevitable, and detached from judges 
themselves. 
We believe, however, that such an account is lacking in at least two 
respects. First, in ways familiar to contemporary equal protection 
jurisprudence, it overly privileges a judge’s conscious and deliberate intent. 
In so doing, it discounts the degree to which automatic and unconscious 
mental processes—biases and heuristics—can impact judicial 
decisionmaking. Second, it is inattentive to how ostensibly neutral biases and 
heuristics, when situated within societal structures and forces that privilege 
Whiteness, can predictably and systematically position judges to overvalue 
statistical data that align with prevailing lay theories that explain existing 
racial disparities as the product of neutral market forces.   
To fill this gap, we adopt an “eCRT”48 approach that coheres around 
core insights from Critical Race Theory (CRT) and complementary findings 
from the motivated social cognition literature. As a point of departure, CRT 
can help locate the Court’s facially inconsistent engagement with social 
science within a continuum of equal protection retrenchment over the past 
half century.49 Somewhat more concretely, a CRT lens illuminates how the 
underlying logic of McCleskey and Chief Justice Rehnquist’s Grutter dissent 
fits within a once nascent and now entrenched “colorblind” 
constitutionalism.50 This “colorblindness” invites, and in many ways 
rationalizes, an equal protection doctrine that has become more hostile to 
race-conscious remedies than to race-neutral practices that reproduce and 
reify this country’s history of racial subordination and stratification.51 
 
 47 We do not mean to deny that, at times, Justices might deliberately “cherry-pick” social science. 
Justices have offered such accounts of their colleagues. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 
505 U.S. 833, 991 n.6 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“But if a court can find an undue burden simply by 
selectively string-citing the right social science articles, I do not see the point of emphasizing or requiring 
‘detailed factual findings’ in the District Court.”) (emphasis added). Our more basic claim, which we 
explore in this Essay, is that the analysis should not focus on conscious intent at the expense of other 
causal factors—such as cognitive biases and heuristics. 
 48 See Carbado & Roithmayr, supra note 8. 
 49 In this sense, CRT offers a theoretical frame that situates McCleskey and Chief Justice Rehnquist’s 
Grutter dissent within a constitutional tradition in which the rise of formal equality has proved insufficient 
to destabilize the basic racial regime that has defined America since its founding. 
 50 See, e.g., Neil Gotanda, A Critique of “Our Constitution is Color-Blind,” 44 STAN. L. REV. 1, 2–
7 (1991). 
 51 Id. 
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This foundational CRT frame is well rehearsed and descriptively 
compelling. Nonetheless, we believe that room remains to build on 
fundamental CRT concepts by wedding the theory to the now well-
established literature on motivated social cognition.52 This intersectional 
approach offers a more textured account of judicial decisionmaking by 
combining a CRT lens mindful of structure and power with empirical 
accounts of individual decisionmaking.53 We proceed in two parts. 
First, we discuss the Justification-Suppression Model of Prejudice 
(JSM), a social-psychological model that can be used to explain how 
systems—such as the law—maintain structures of racial hierarchy.54 
Although historically siloed within the field of social psychology, JSM 
naturally combines with CRT to provide a more comprehensive account of 
the way in which human cognition, as a function of the structures and 
societies in which we live, tends to reproduce inequality and racial 
stratification.55 Second, using JSM as a bridge, we introduce the “elite 
student paradigm,” a theoretical model that illuminates how independent yet 
intersecting and reinforcing cognitive biases and heuristics will predictably 
and systematically lead judges to defer to evidence (irrespective of its 
 
 52 There is a body of emerging legal scholarship that draws on social cognition literatures. See, e.g., 
Jonathan Feingold, . . . And Diversity for All, UTAH L. REV. (forthcoming 2018) (discussing the social 
identity threat and stereotype threat literatures); Jerry Kang & Kristin Lane, Seeing Through 
Colorblindness: Implicit Bias and the Law, 58 UCLA L. REV. 465, 467–68 (2010) (discussing the implicit 
bias literature). Scholars have also become increasingly intentional about bridging structural and 
individual actor analyses. See, e.g., Devon W. Carbado, Predatory Policing, 85 UMKC L. REV. 545 
(2017). 
 53 Our treatment of CRT and the motivated reasoning literatures is far from exhaustive. Multiple 
theories and frameworks from both could add to our analysis. Nonetheless, for purposes of scope, our 
primary intent is to demonstrate how integrating these often uncoupled perspectives offers a more 
comprehensive lens through which to appreciate the continuities that thread the Court’s seemingly 
inconsistent relationship with statistical evidence in the equal protection context. 
 54 Although prevalent in the social science literature, JSM is effectively absent from legal 
scholarship. We have identified only eleven law review articles that mention JSM (based on a Nov. 11, 
2017 Westlaw search for “justification /1 suppression”). In the majority of the articles, JSM features as a 
footnote. See, e.g., Rachel D. Godsil & L. Song Richardson, Racial Anxiety, 102 IOWA L. REV. 2235, 
2240 & n.26 (2017) (invoking JSM in the context of a discussion on racial anxiety). Beyond JSM, other 
complementary theories from the social sciences that remain largely absent from the legal literature 
include, inter alia, social dominance theory. One notable exception includes David Simson, Fool Me 
Once, Shame on You; Fool Me Twice, Shame on You Again: How Disparate Treatment Doctrine 
Perpetuates Racial Hierarchy, HOUS. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019). 
 55 Many of CRT’s fundamental principles find echoes in social science scholarship, including 
concerns about biases, decisionmaking, and prejudice that span individual and structural accounts of 
discrimination. By integrating these literatures, we can build on scholarship that has thickened CRT with 
relevant empirical scholarship and buttressed the empirical literature by filtering it through a CRT lens. 
See, e.g., Carbado & Roithmayr, supra note 8; Osagie K. Obasogie, Foreword: Critical Race Theory and 
Empirical Methods, 3 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 183 (2013).  
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objective quality) that aligns with prevailing lay theories regarding racial 
disparities in American society. 
A. The Justification-Suppression Model 
Social psychologists have long examined the underpinnings of 
prejudice,56 including its origins and manifestations in American society.57 In 
an attempt to synthesize the “best known and empirically supported theories 
[of prejudice],” Christian Crandall and Amy Eshleman developed the 
Justification-Suppression Model of Prejudice (the JSM).58 This broad theory 
posits that everyone possesses “‘genuine’ prejudice,” understood as “pure, 
unadulterated, original, unmanaged, and unambivalently negative feelings 
toward members of a devalued group.”59 Genuine prejudice, however, is 
rarely—if ever—expressed. Rather, internal60 and external61 factors allow 
(i.e., justify) or restrict (i.e., suppress) the actual expression of prejudice. The 
ultimate expression of prejudice, in turn, is a function of the balance between 
available and existing justifiers and suppressors. 
For purposes of this Essay, we focus on the JSM’s conception of a 
“justifier,” which Crandall and Eshleman define as “any psychological or 
social process that can serve as an opportunity to express genuine prejudice 
without suffering external or internal sanction.”62 Justifiers function as the 
“releasers of prejudice,”63 effectively providing “cover” for otherwise 
prejudiced behavior that would garner public rebuke. But justifiers do not 
operate solely to rationalize prejudice to an external audience. They also 
permit those engaging in prejudiced conduct to maintain an egalitarian 
concept of self. 
The concept of a justifier effortlessly translates to Supreme Court 
jurisprudence. In situations where a decision will predictably be 
 
 56 The term “prejudice” is susceptible to many meanings. For purposes of this Essay, we adopt 
Crandall and Eshleman’s definition that “prejudice [is] a negative evaluation of a social group or a 
negative evaluation of an individual that is significantly based on the individual’s group membership.” 
Christian S. Crandall & Amy Eshleman, A Justification–Suppression Model of the Expression and 
Experience of Prejudice, 129 PSYCHOL. BULL. 414, 414 (2003). 
 57 See generally John Duckitt, Psychology and Prejudice: A Historical Analysis and Integrative 
Framework, 47 AM. PSYCHOL. 1182 (1992) (reviewing different social psychological approaches to 
researching and understanding prejudice). 
 58 Crandall & Eshleman, supra note 56. 
 59 Id. at 418. 
 60 Internal factors include, inter alia, personal belief systems or values (e.g., religion) that proscribe 
discrimination. See infra Section II.A–B. 
 61 External factors include, inter alia, social norms (e.g., against being racist) and public 
accountability for transgressing such norms. See id. 
 62 Crandall & Eshleman, supra note 56, at 425. 
 63 Id. 
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characterized and contested as racist, prejudiced, or otherwise contrary to 
salient egalitarian norms, the Court may mobilize a justifier to defend, mask, 
or otherwise rationalize its decision.64 Multiple common justifiers, including 
the ostensibly neutral goal of status quo maintenance, visibly operate across 
the Court’s equal protection jurisprudence.65 
In McCleskey, for instance, the Court expressly rejected the Baldus 
Study, in part, because of its potential to disrupt the status quo—specifically, 
the capital punishment regime in Georgia and beyond.66 Although more 
oblique in Grutter, Chief Justice Rehnquist’s skepticism of the Law School’s 
admissions policy was predicated, at least in part, on a colorblind vision of 
neutrality that associated any departure from the status quo (here, understood 
as race-blind admissions) as anathema to equality. In other words, by treating 
race-blind admissions as the neutral baseline, the Chief Justice could 
predicate on egalitarian norms his hostility to the Law School’s race-
conscious admissions program. Moreover, any racial disparities that flow 
from a race-blind admissions regime—even if the product of biased 
admissions policies—are explained and rationalized as the product of natural 
and neutral market forces.67   
Although the “justifier” terminology is foreign to CRT, it aligns with 
foundational CRT insights that have illuminated what effectively function as 
jurisprudential justifiers across legal doctrine and scholarship.68 These 
 
 64 Justifiers have a long history in the Supreme Court’s Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence. See, 
e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 223 (1944) (“Regardless of the true nature of the assembly 
and relocation centers—and we deem it unjustifiable to call them concentration camps with all the ugly 
connotations that term implies—we are dealing specifically with nothing but an exclusion order. To cast 
this case into outlines of racial prejudice, without reference to the real military dangers which were 
presented, merely confuses the issue. Korematsu was not excluded from the Military Area because of 
hostility to him or his race.”); The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 25 (1883) (“When a man has emerged 
from slavery, and by the aid of beneficent legislation has shaken off the inseparable concomitants of that 
state, there must be some stage in the progress of his elevation when he takes the rank of a mere citizen, 
and ceases to be the special favorite of the laws, and when his rights as a citizen, or a man, are to be 
protected in the ordinary modes by which other men’s rights are protected.”). 
 65 See Crandall & Eshleman, supra note 56, at 426. 
 66 See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 292–93 (1987) (“In its broadest form, McCleskey’s claim 
of discrimination extends to every actor in the Georgia capital sentencing process . . . . McCleskey’s 
claim that these statistics are sufficient proof of discrimination, without regard to the facts of a particular 
case, would extend to all capital cases in Georgia, at least where the victim was white and the defendant 
is black.”) (emphasis added); see also supra note 20. 
 67 See Crandall & Eshleman, supra note 56, at 426. For some, fidelity to neutral and natural market 
forces is predicated on the notion that “what is, is good.” Id. The act of status quo baselining allows those 
who hold prejudices about marginalized groups to wash their hands of any responsibility to change them. 
 68 For instance, scholars have critiqued opponents of affirmative action for mobilizing “model 
minority” rhetoric to deploy Asian Pacific Americans as “racial mascots” in order to “insulat[e] 
themselves from charges of racism.” Robert S. Chang, The Invention of Asian Americans, 3 U.C. IRVINE 
L. REV. 947, 963 (2013) (quoting Sumi Cho, Remarks at the First Annual Asian Pacific American Law 
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include, for instance, the way in which proffered commitments to 
indeterminate concepts such as “neutrality,” “merit,” and “anti-
discrimination,” when situated within a colorblind frame, are employed to 
justify a constitutional jurisprudence that maintains racial hierarchy and 
reinstantiates racial subordination.69 In the admissions context, for instance, 
status quo maintenance can naturalize disparities as the product of neutral 
processes such that racial parity requires departing from “fair” and 
“meritocratic” standards. 
Accordingly, the JSM offers a complementary yet distinct frame that 
buttresses CRT by delivering an empirically based model of prejudice and 
its manifestation. The JSM also bridges CRT and other dimensions of the 
motivated social cognition literature. Specifically, we explore an integrated 
approach mindful of the relationship between common biases and heuristics 
on the one hand, and socially salient stereotypes on the other. Such an 
approach exposes how ostensibly neutral cognitive processes will 
predictably and systematically operate as justifiers that facilitate prejudice in 
the form of judicial deference to evidence that reinforces and perpetuates 
racial hierarchy in America. 
B. The Perils of Presuming “Fit” 
Cognitive biases and heuristics function as mental filters and shortcuts 
that help humans quickly and effortlessly process, interpret, and manage 
information.70 These automatic and subconscious cognitive processes are 
critical. Without them, we could never process the millions (if not billions) 
of bits of data we consume every second.71 Although these processes are 
 
Professors Conference: A Theory of Racial Mascotting (Oct. 14, 1994)); see also Gabriel J. Chin et al., 
Beyond Self-Interest: Asian Pacific Americans Toward a Community of Justice, a Policy Analysis of 
Affirmative Action, 4 UCLA ASIAN PAC. AM. L.J. 129, 161 (1996) (noting that opponents of affirmative 
action have used Asian Pacific Americans to claim moral authority when advocating regressive policies); 
Sumi Cho, Redeeming Whiteness in the Shadow of Internment: Earl Warren, Brown, and a Theory of 
Racial Redemption, 40 B.C. L. REV. 73, 120 (1998) (“[R]acial redemption theory is available for a wide 
range of purposes, including . . . explaining the increasing use of people of color as spokespersons or 
‘racial mascots’ for racially regressive policies and reconciling the increasing equality discourse with the 
decreasing yield in material resources to redress inequality.”). 
 69 Translated to contemporary equal protection doctrine, one could characterize as a justifier any 
number of theoretical and jurisprudential moves that permit that court to state that the Equal Protection 
Clause is as skeptical of racial remedies designed to promote integration as it is with Jim Crow laws that 
mandated segregation. 
 70 Richard. E. Nisbett, et al., Psychological Review: The Use of Statistical Heuristics in Everyday 
Inductive Reasoning, AM. PSYCHOL. ASS’N, INC. (1983) (describing heuristics as “rapid and more or less 
automatic judgmental rules of thumb” that allow humans to process the millions of pieces of information 
we encounter on a daily basis). 
 71 See id. (explaining that biases and heuristics help relieve our brains of more menial decisions to 
create space for more complex interactions and behaviors); see also C. Neil Macrae et al., Stereotypes as 
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beneficial, unchecked reliance on biases and heuristics creates predictable 
and systematic judgment errors—for instance, by eliciting lopsided 
information search and retrieval—that compromise our ability to engage in 
“rational”72 behavior and decisionmaking. This occurs because biases and 
heuristics, as helpful as they are, often entice us to “incorporate the 
irrelevant”73 when making decisions, often without us even knowing it.74 Our 
decisions and behavior pay the price. 
1. Biases and Heuristics 
Two common heuristics include the “representativeness heuristic” and 
the “availability heuristic.”75 Both are frequently activated when humans 
encounter questions of probability. The representativeness heuristic 
describes the process in which humans, when assessing the probability that 
an object belongs to a category, (over)rely on prototypical objects that one 
associates with that category.76 In other words, the representativeness 
heuristic offers a shortcut (the use of a prototypical case) to assess the “fit” 
between an object and a given category.77 
To provide a concrete example, consider the following question: is a 
tomato a fruit or a vegetable?78 There are multiple ways to answer this 
question, but people frequently draw on prototypical fruits and vegetables, 
and then ask with which the tomato is a better fit. If, for you, “fruit” conjures 
apple, banana, grape, and “vegetable” elicits lettuce, carrots, cucumber, then 
 
Energy-Saving Devices: A Peek Inside the Cognitive Toolbox, 66 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 37, 
44–45 (1994). 
 72 An ongoing debate exists in the social sciences about whether biases are rational or irrational. 
Cognitive processes that employ rules to help us get to faster, and largely accurate, decisions are 
beneficial. However, our decisionmaking can be swayed, or biased, by any number of factors. When 
factors like subtle shifts in the environment or question order materially impact our judgment or decisions, 
many would describe this as irrational.  
 73 See Gretchen. B. Chapman & Eric. J. Johnson, Incorporating the Irrelevant: Anchors in Judgments 
of Belief and Value, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT (T. Gilovich 
et al. eds., 2002). 
 74 Irrelevant information can come from a variety of sources, including ourselves (e.g., the “how-do-
I-feel-about-it” heuristic), see Norbert Schwarz & Gerald. L. Clore, Mood, Misattribution, and Judgments 
of Well-Being: Informative and Directive Functions of Affective States, 45 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 513, 513 (1983); a speaker’s attributes (e.g., whether they are attractive), see Richard E. Petty 
& John T. Cacioppo, The Elaboration Likelihood Model of Persuasion, 19 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL 
SOC. PSYCHOL. 123, 125 (1986); or the sequence of questions, see Norbert Schwarz et al., Assimilation 
and Contrast Effects in Part-Whole Question Sequences: A Conversational Logic Analysis, 55 PUB. 
OPINION Q. 3, 19 (1991). 
 75 See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 
185 SCI. 1124, 1124, 1127 (1974). 
 76 Id. at 1124. 
 77 See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Psychological Review: Extensional Versus Intuitive 
Reasoning: The Conjunction Fallacy in Probability Judgment, AM. PSYCHOL. ASS’N, INC. (1983). 
 78 Thanks to Victor Quintanilla for suggesting this helpful analogy. 
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tomato likely goes in the vegetable category. Why? Because a tomato 
probably does not fit in your fruit salad, but would nicely complement your 
vegetable salad. Here, relying on fit alone leads you down the incorrect path; 
a tomato is a fruit, not a vegetable.79 
The availability heuristic describes the tendency to assess the 
probability of an event as a function of how easily the particular outcome 
comes to mind.80 Although not inherently problematic, the likelihood of a 
given outcome rarely tracks how easily one can imagine the scenario 
unfolding. Thus, when an event is particularly salient—regardless of actual 
“base rates”—we fail to adjust our mental calculations and overestimate its 
likelihood. 
For instance, a nervous traveler boarding an airplane may wonder about 
the likelihood that her plane will crash. The availability heuristic suggests 
that if this person can easily imagine the plane crashing (perhaps because a 
recent crash is dominating news headlines), she might conclude that the 
likelihood of the plane crashing is quite high. Notwithstanding how easily 
the terrifying crash can be imagined, its actual likelihood is minute.81 The 
passenger nonetheless remains concerned about a crash throughout the flight. 
Automatic mental shortcuts such as the representativeness and 
availability heuristics can create the illusion that we have all the information 
we need to render a responsible judgment.  This illusion can interfere with 
our motivation to conduct a more thorough information search, even when 
one would be prudent. To complicate matters, these heuristics often interact 
with other mental processes that undermine “rational” judgment.  
Take, for instance, the phenomenon of confirmation bias. To appreciate 
how it functions, consider the following riddle.82 We have defined a rule that 
all sequences of three numbers must obey. The following sequence of three 
numbers obeys our rule: 2 | 4 | 8. Can you identify the rule? You likely have 
 
 79 Colloquially tomatoes are more commonly understood as vegetables, but this is exactly where the 
representativeness heuristic fails us in decisionmaking. Instead of asking deeper questions about what 
assumptions we are making, and weighing the available information (in a way that would require 
incorporating our conscious, controlled processing mechanisms), we use the faster shortcut and determine 
“good enough.” 
 80 See Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 77. 
 81 Recent statistics from the International Air Transport Association (IATA) reveal that, out of 36.4 
million flights in 2013, only 81 accidents occurred, 16 of which were fatal. Press Release, Internat’l Air 
Transport Ass’n, IATA Releases 2013 Safety Performance – Encouraging Signs for African Safety (Apr. 
1, 2014), http://www.iata.org/pressroom/pr/Pages/2014-04-01-02.aspx [https://perma.cc/YYL8-MM7L]. 
 82 The inspiration for this puzzle comes from a 2015 David Leonhardt article. See David Leonhardt, 
A Quick Puzzle to Test Your Problem Solving, N.Y. TIMES: THE UPSHOT (July 2, 2015), 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/07/03/upshot/a-quick-puzzle-to-test-your-problem-
solving.html [https://perma.cc/467P-642S]. 
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a working hypothesis. But before answering, consider the following 
sequences: 
 
A: 4 | 8 | 16 
B: 5 | 7 | 10 
C: 3 | 1 | 23 
 
Of these three, which (if any) also obey the rule? Most readers are likely 
thinking the following: “It’s A. Obviously, it’s A. The rule is straightforward: 
moving left to right, double the preceding number.” That response is 
incorrect yet predictably common. A is not the only sequence from the above 
list that satisfies the rule. Rather, A and B satisfy the rule, which requires 
only that, moving left to right, each number be larger than the one preceding 
it. 
Surprised? You are not alone.83 Although simple, the exercise activates 
the pervasive and common cognitive process known as confirmation bias, 
which captures the human tendency to overemphasize information that 
supports an initial hypothesis and discount or ignore countervailing 
evidence.84 In the foregoing exercise, most participants overvalue A because 
it satisfies an initial hypothesis. This occurs at the expense of other available 
information and potential hypotheses (that may, as here, also be correct). 
The foregoing examples—this riddle, the probability of a plane crash, 
classifying a tomato—may seem inconsequential and only tangentially 
related to the inquiry motivating this Essay. However, these seemingly 
neutral and innocuous processes also impact our judgments about people, 
discrimination, and existing societal inequalities. Often, when they do, it is 
in part a function of socially salient stereotypes about relevant social 
categories such as race, gender, or age. 
2. Stereotypes 
Stereotypes refer to attributes or traits associated with a social 
category.85 Although sometimes siloed from the broader cognitive biases and 
heuristics literature, stereotypes are critical to our analysis of the Justices’ 
 
 83 We regularly give presentations on biases and heuristics and often employ this exercise. On 
multiple occasions, an audience member has rejected our answer, suggested that we were incorrect (that 
is, about our rule), or accused us of being unfair. 
 84 Confirmation bias falls in the category of “positive test strategies.” Joshua Klayman & Young-
Won Ha, Confirmation, Disconfirmation, and Information in Hypothesis Testing, 94 PSYCHOL. REV. 211, 
225 (1987). 
 85 See Patricia G. Devine & Andrew J. Elliot, Are Racial Stereotypes Really Fading?: The Princeton 
Trilogy Revisited, 21 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1139, 1140 (1995). 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W  O N L I N E 
264 
seemingly inconsistent use of social science.86 At one level, cognitive biases 
and heuristics exist independent of stereotypes and the broader social, 
political, and historical context in which we live.87 However, when it comes 
to perceiving individual people and society more broadly, stereotypes 
frequently form the substantive content that undergirds cognitive biases and 
heuristics and their influence on how we see the world.88 That is, just as 
societal forces (such as media portrayals and common discourse) determine 
what we “know” as the prototypical fruit, societal forces also impact what 
we “know” about the prototypical criminal, student, or surgeon. 
Stereotypes have multiple origins. On the one hand, stereotypes arise 
from direct experiences—that is, actual interpersonal encounters with 
individuals from a particular social group. But stereotypes, particularly as 
they operate across social groups,89 are often the product of vicarious 
experiences—that is, “simulated engagements with racial others provided 
through various forms of the media or narrated by parents and our peers.”90 
Regardless of their origin—direct or vicarious experience—stereotypes, 
often by informing the operation of cognitive biases and heuristics, influence 
our judgments about people. 
To appreciate the way in which stereotypes interact with otherwise 
neutral cognitive processes, consider the findings from John M. Darley and 
Paget H. Gross’s 1983 study on the hypothesis-confirming effect of 
stereotypes.91 Darley and Gross asked participants to watch a video of 
“Hannah,” an elementary school-aged girl, perform a variety of academic 
tasks.92 Here’s the twist: although all participants watched the exact same 
 
 86 Beyond concerns about racial inequality, biases and heuristics can produce results that many would 
find unjust, or problematically vulnerable to subtle environmental changes that are otherwise irrelevant 
to the merits of an individual case. See, e.g., Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL 
L. REV. 777, 791–94 (2001) (describing how anchoring affected the judgments of magistrate judges). 
 87 Susan T. Fiske, Stereotyping, Prejudice, and Discrimination, in 2 HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL 
PSYCHOL. 357, 365–66 (Daniel T. Gilbert et al. eds., 4th ed. 1998). 
 88 Consider, for instance, Jerry Kang’s notion of “racial mechanics.” Jerry Kang, Cyber-Race, 
113 HARV. L. REV. 1130, 1139–45 (2000); see also Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118 HARV. L. 
REV. 1489, 1497–1504 (2005) (describing how “racial mechanics” operates in part through racial 
categories into which individuals are placed, and this process triggers meanings associated with the 
category, thereby affecting interpersonal interactions) [hereinafter Trojan Horses]. 
 89 Given racial segregation in contemporary American society, meaningful intergroup contact can be 
rare. See Daniel Cox et al., Race, Religion, and Political Affiliation of Americans’ Core Social Networks, 
PUB. RELIGION RESEARCH INST. (Aug. 3, 2016) https://www.prri.org/research/poll-race-religion-politics-
americans-social-networks/#.VTmjK61Vikp [https://perma.cc/4FAA-XBBR]. 
 90 See Kang, Trojan Horses, supra note 88, at 1539–40. 
 91 See generally John M. Darley & Paget H. Gross, A Hypothesis-Confirming Bias in Labeling 
Effects, 44 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 20 (1983) (concluding that some stereotype information 
creates falsely confirmed hypotheses about stereotyped individuals). 
 92 Id. at 23. 
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video, half of the participants were told that Hannah was poor; the other half 
were told that she came from a wealthy family.93  
Darley and Gross predicted that socially salient stereotypes about class 
would impact the participants’ evaluations.94 They were correct. On average, 
participants who believed Hannah was wealthy rated her performance across 
various criteria higher than did those who believed Hannah was poor.95 Thus, 
in the same way that other heuristics encourage people to “incorporate the 
irrelevant” into their decisions, so too did participants in the Darley and 
Gross study—who unknowingly incorporated information concerning 
Hannah’s socioeconomic status, notwithstanding its irrelevance, in a way 
that impacted their actual evaluations. 
3. The Elite Student Paradigm 
Although there has been an observable shift toward egalitarian norms 
and commitments, American society remains defined by socially salient 
stereotypes and attitudes that privilege and normalize Whiteness.96 We 
suggest that these stereotypes serve as a filter through which the 
aforementioned biases and heuristics impact real world behavior—
including, for instance, a judge’s engagement with statistical evidence of 
discrimination. 
Other scholars have previously linked stereotypes and heuristics to 
biased judgments and decisionmaking. In 2012, L. Song Richardson and 
Phillip Atiba Goff developed the suspicion heuristic “to explain the 
predictable errors in perception, decision-making, and action that can occur 
when individuals make judgments of criminality.”97 The suspicion heuristic 
bridged insights from scholarship on heuristics and implicit racial biases to 
explain how perceiving race—absent explicit racial prejudice—can 
nonetheless bias judgments about criminality. 
Building on this concept, Devon W. Carbado and Daria Roithmayr 
developed the “black suspicion paradigm,” which offered a more racially 
inflected model depicting the many discrete but interacting and intersecting 
cognitive processes and social phenomena that contribute to disparate 
 
 93 Id. 
 94 Id. at 22. 
 95 Id. at 28. 
 96 Socially salient stereotypes extend beyond race to include, inter alia, gender, age, religion, ability 
status. For purposes of scope, we focus on the relationship between biases and heuristics and socially 
salient racial stereotypes. We recognize that this one-dimensional analysis is limited, and inevitably tells 
an artificially shallow story about the relationship between identities, society, social psychology, and the 
law. 
 97 See L. Song Richardson & Phillip Atiba Goff, Self-Defense and the Suspicion Heuristic, 98 IOWA 
L. REV. 293, 296 (2012). 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W  O N L I N E 
266 
policing of African Americans.98 The “black suspicion paradigm” effectively 
operates as follows: First, interstitial social forces (e.g., media 
representations, public discourse, lay theories about race) produce pervasive 
racial stereotypes (linking Black with criminality) and salient images of the 
prototypical criminal (the African American).99 This “racial epistemology” 
then produces the “black criminal availability heuristic” and “black criminal 
representativeness heuristic,” respectively.100 Although distinct, these co-
constitutive and reinforcing heuristics collectively form the “racial suspicion 
heuristic,” which shapes behavior in the real world. 
We translate this analysis to the higher education context, where 
socially salient stereotypes about Black intellectual inferiority is particularly 
relevant. Grounded in Carbado and Roithmayr’s model, our “elite student 
paradigm” goes one step further by integrating an additional cognitive 
process: confirmation bias. Tracking the “black suspicion paradigm,” our 
model begins with societal forces that create “racial lay theories” in the 
domain of higher education.101 These racial lay theories contain multiple 
components, each of which reinforces a collective imagination that renders 
Black students perpetual outsiders to the elite institution. These components 
include: (a) racialized conceptions about the prototypical student (White 
students) and (b) racial stereotypes concerning intellectual capacity (lacking 
in Black students). Individually and collectively, these components create 
racialized understandings regarding who belongs at, and who deserves to be 
at, elite institutions (White students).102   
These lay theories, in turn, produce a White student representativeness 
heuristic (the prototypical student is White) and a White student availability 
heuristic (White students belong at elite institutions). These distinct but 
reinforcing heuristics center White students as the racial baseline and 
marginalize Black students as perpetual elite university outsiders who are 
unable to enter on their own merit. 
The elite student paradigm shapes real world behavior on multiple 
fronts, within and outside the university. Within the university, Black 
 
 98 See Carbado & Roithmayr, supra note 8, at 153. 
 99 Id. 
 100 Id. 
 101 Prominent societal forces include “media representations, popular and political discourses, and 
existing racial stratification . . . .” Id. 
 102 This model is stylized in ways that obscure important nuance. For instance, it would be 
incomplete to suggest that the intersection of stereotypes, biases, and heuristics operate only vis-à-vis 
White and Black students. Asian students, as one additional example, often occupy a middle ground in 
which “model minority” stereotypes situate Asians as intellectually talented (and therefore presumably 
“deserving” of admission), yet Asians nonetheless remain racialized as perpetual foreigners to the 
university (and the nation). See supra note 68 and accompanying text. 
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students (and faculty)—regardless of the individual’s talents and 
accolades—often confront a presumption of incompetence and non-
belonging.103 As a result, particularly when severely underrepresented,104 
Black students are presumed to have received preferential treatment pursuant 
to non-“meritocratic” admissions processes.105 
Outside of the university, the elite student paradigm explains why 
theories of Black inferiority—regardless of the underlying methods or 
objective validity—gain greater traction in public discourse, the national 
media, and the Supreme Court than do countervailing theories that explain 
academic achievement gaps as the product of environmental contingencies 
that uniquely burden students of color—even if predicated on decades of 
social science.106  
It is here that confirmation bias can help explain the tendency to defer 
to, and mobilize, “evidence” that aligns with salient lay theories about race 
in higher education.  Recall that confirmation bias describes the tendency to 
overvalue evidence that supports one’s underlying hypothesis and to 
discount or reject countervailing evidence. Thus, a Justice (or lay observer) 
who envisions the “typical” student in a way that tracks racial lay theories 
informed by the elite student paradigm will search for and prioritize 
information that confirms that, indeed, White students are inherently 
deserving of admission and that Black students are not. Should that 
individual encounter evidence to the contrary, confirmation bias makes it 
more likely that the information will be dismissed or otherwise subordinated 
in the decisionmaking process.  
 
 103 See Angela P. Harris & Carmen G. González, Introduction to PRESUMED INCOMPETENT 1, 1 
(Gabriella Gutiérrez y Muhs et al. eds., 2012). 
 104 See Deidre M. Bowen, Brilliant Disguise: An Empirical Analysis of a Social Experiment Banning 
Affirmative Action, 85 IND. L.J. 1197, 1234 (2010). This result is, arguably, counterintuitive. If one 
presumes that racial disparities are the product of market forces, the ability of someone from a severely 
underrepresented group to access a competitive domain should signal unique talent and resilience. 
Instead, the common interpretation is that the person was the beneficiary of preferential treatment. 
 105 In his Grutter dissent, Chief Justice Rehnquist suggested that the Law School’s admission of 
Black students required a deviation from merit that occurred at the expense of more deserving White 
students. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 385–86 (2003) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (“The Law 
School cannot precisely control which of its admitted applicants decide to attend the university. But it 
can and, as the numbers demonstrate, clearly does employ racial preferences in extending offers of 
admission. Indeed, the ostensibly flexible nature of the Law School’s admissions program that the Court 
finds appealing, appears to be, in practice, a carefully managed program designed to ensure proportionate 
representation of applicants from selected minority groups.”) (internal citations omitted). 
 106 See, e.g., Dan Slater, Does Affirmative Action Do What It Should?, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 16, 2013) 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/17/opinion/sunday/does-affirmative-action-do-what-it-should.html 
(discussing the emergence of “mismatch theory” in affirmative action debates) [https://perma.cc/M4MQ-
82SL]. 
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The elite student paradigm can accordingly impact judicial adjudication 
and institutional governance in the admissions context. Importantly, the elite 
student paradigm’s explanatory power is not limited to situations in which a 
judge, as in Chief Justice Rehnquist’s Grutter dissent, mobilizes descriptive 
statistics to support a claim of reverse racism.107 Even the Grutter majority, 
for instance, treated race-conscious admissions as a deviation from 
fundamental equality norms—albeit one necessary to achieve the compelling 
interest of student body diversity.108  
In this sense, although Grutter saved affirmative action in higher 
education, it was arguably premised on a vision of the university that 
centered and normalized Whiteness, while reinforcing the portrayal of Black 
students as institutional outsiders.   
CONCLUSION 
Although stylized, the “elite student paradigm” demonstrates how 
deeply engrained stereotypes can operate as filters through which Justices 
interpret evidence and engineer doctrine. For many, a natural next question 
is how to mitigate these biases and heuristics in judicial decisionmaking. 
To (begin to) answer this question, we turn to a lesson from a canonical 
1978 study on confirmation bias by Mark Snyder and William B. Swann, 
Jr.109 Among other things, Snyder and Swann wanted to test whether 
incentives for better performance would mitigate the effects of confirmation 
bias.110 The incentives proved ineffective; even when prizes were offered, 
participants continued to engage in a biased information search that 
undermined performance. 
We highlight this study not to concede that automatic cognitive 
processes inevitably and insurmountably undermine genuinely equitable 
judicial decisionmaking. Nonetheless, we find it useful to mark that there is 
likely no panacea and that debiasing remains more difficult than many 
appreciate (even when we acknowledge our own fallibility).  
 
 107 To be clear, we are not suggesting that confirmation bias was necessarily a causal factor in Chief 
Justice Rehnquist’s disparate treatment of data in McCleskey and Grutter. Nonetheless, the social science 
offers an evidence-based theory that helps explain, and in some sense harmonize, the Chief Justice’s 
facially inconsistent treatment of data in these two cases. 
 108 See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 342 (“[R]acial classifications, however compelling their goals, are 
potentially so dangerous that they may be employed no more broadly than the interest demands. 
Enshrining a permanent justification for racial preferences would offend this fundamental equal 
protection principle.”). 
 109 Mark Snyder & William B. Swann, Jr., Hypothesis-Testing Processes in Social Interaction, 36 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1202, 1209–10 (1978). 
 110 Id. 
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That said, the social science provides valuable insights. At a minimum, 
we should all openly recognize that regardless of any earnest commitment to 
neutrality and objectivity, prevailing stereotypes, in conjunction with 
prevalent biases and heuristics, render us all—even judges—more receptive 
to evidence that aligns with lay theories regarding racial disparities and 
discrimination. This means that judges may unknowingly give greater 
deference to evidence of “reverse racism” than traditional discrimination 
claims. Therefore, and assuming that judges should treat all statistical 
evidence objectively and on the merits, executing equality may require 
structural counterpreference strategies designed to mitigate an invisible 
unevenness that, if unchecked, will predictably and systematically privilege 
and reinforce the status quo and existing racial hierarchies in American 
society. 
